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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act' (NLRA) was enacted with the
intent to protect employees' rights to organize and engage in certain
collective action and to facilitate collective bargaining between labor
and management.2 The labor-management relationship carries with it
certain rights and duties which are delineated in sections 7 and 8 of
the NLRA.3 Section 7 outlines activities engaged in by labor which
are "protected," including the right to strike.4 Section 8 outlines activi-
1. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
3. Id § 157-58.
4. Id § 157.
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ties engaged in by both labor and management which are "prohibited"
as unfair labor practices.5 Also included in section 8 is the duty to
bargain collectively in good faith for both labor and management.6
Although the NLRA outlines these rights and duties in a fairly
clear manner, it fails to discuss the areas that remain open for state
regulation. As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated, the
Act "leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from
telling us how much."' Notwithstanding this statement by the Court,
as NLRA preemption principles have developed, state regulation of the
labor-management relationship has been largely displaced.8
Recently, in Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton (Rum Creek
1I) 9, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck
down West 'Virginia's Neutrality Statute, holding it to be preempted by
the NLRA.'0 This Comment discusses the development of federal pre-
emption principles under the NLRA and their application to the deci-
sion in Rum Creek IL The discussion will explain the nuances of
preemption principles, especially as they relate to the facts in Rum
Creek IL The analysis will focus on questions concerning the current
status of the preempted statute and the apparent imposition of an affir-
mative duty on the State Police in a labor dispute. Although the
court's opinion leaves these questions unanswered, the court's decision
to preempt the statute as it was interpreted and applied comports with
existing NLRA preemption principles.
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LABOR LAW
Prior to the articulation of current preemption principles, the Su-
preme Court of the United States, in UAW v. Wisconsin Employment
5. Id. § 158.
6. 1&
7. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 489 (1953).
8. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); San Diego Building Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
9. 971 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Rum Creek 11].
10. Id.
[Vol. 95:877
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss3/10
RUM CREEK
Relations Board (commonly referred to as the Briggs-Stratton case),"
held that a state could regulate activity that was neither protected nor
prohibited under the auspices of the National Labor Relations Act.
12
The Court declared that intermittent work stoppages engaged in by
employees and encouraged by the union did not fall within the
protections or prohibitions contained in sections 7 and 8 of the
NLRA.13 Furthermore, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
had jurisdiction over strike activities having an illegal purpose but not
over such activities utilizing an illegal method, as did those in Briggs-
Stratton.'4 The Court thus held that no conflict existed between the
NLRA and the state regulation because the NLRA simply did not
encompass the activity in question.' 5 Based on the fact that the
NLRA did not encompass this activity, the Court further declared that
if the state did not regulate such conduct, it was not subject to regula-
tion by any entity.16 As preemption doctrine evolved, however, the
Court realized that the holding in Briggs-Stratton did not promote
uniformity in the labor law arena and refused to follow the deci-
sion. 1 7
A. The Garmon Doctrine
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,8 the Supreme
Court addressed the concern that state regulations and causes of action
concerning labor-management conduct interfered with the uniform
11. 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (Briggs-Stratton).
12. Id
13. Id. at 253.
14. Id. (emphasis added)
15. Id.
16. Ie; see also United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers of Am. v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (holding that states are not stripped of their
traditional police powers in regulating mass picketing, threats, and violence during a labor
dispute).
17. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 n.4 (1958) (holding Briggs-Stratton overruled except where a
state seeks to regulate violent activity associated with a labor dispute).
18. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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national rule of the NLRA in labor disputes. 9 This concern led the
Court to hold that where the activity that a state seeks to regulate is
even arguably protected or prohibited under sections 7 or 8 of the
NLRA, the state is not free to regulate the activity even if the NLRB
refused to act.
20 
'
The employer in Garmon commenced actions with both the state
and the NLRB to enjoin peaceful union picketing.21 Although the
NLRB declined to assert jurisdiction, the state court granted an injunc-
tion against the union and awarded damages to the employer.22 On
appeal, the California Supreme Court upheld the lower court's power
over the dispute on the bases that the NLRB had declined to act and
that the conduct of the union was an unfair labor practice under the
NLRA.23
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and
held that "the refusal of the [NLRB] to assert jurisdiction did not
leave with the states power over activities they otherwise would be
preempted from regulating."2 On remand, the California Supreme
Court set aside the injunction but sustained the award of damages. 2
The Supreme Court heard the case again aid held that a state
could not award damages for activity that it could not enjoin.26 In
reaching this decision, the Court stated that Congress intended to place
the administration of the nation's labor policy with the NLRB as a
centralized administrative agency equipped with specialized procedures,
knowledge, and experience in the area of labor relations.27 The Court
in Garmon relied heavily on its decision in Garner v. Teamsters Un-
ion:28
19. Id.
20. Id. at 245.
21. Id at 239.
22. Id at 237-38.
23. Id
24. Id at 238.
25. Id at 239.
26. Id
27. Id at 242.
28. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
[Vol. 95:877
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Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be
enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It
went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a
specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular proce-
dure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, in-
cluding judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evi-
dently considered that centralized administration of specially designed
procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive
rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a
variety of local procedures and attitudes towards labor controversies ....
A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to
produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of
substantive law. .... "
Although the Garmon Court explicitly placed activities even argu-
ably protected or prohibited under sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA in the
primary jurisdiction of the NLRB, the Court did not resolve the ques-
tion whether a state is preempted from regulating activities that are not
so protected or prohibited.3"
B. The Machinists Doctrine
The focus of the Machinists doctrine differs fundamentally from
that of the Garmon doctrine. While the Garmon doctrine places prima-
ry jurisdiction over protected or prohibited activities with the NLRB,
the focus of the Machinists doctrine is on activities that are not subject
to any regulation because Congress intended that the activities be left
to the free play of economic forces in the collective bargaining pro-
cess.
31
The seeds of the Machinists doctrine were sown in NLRB v. Insur-
ance Agents' International Union32 and Teamsters Union v. Mor-
ton.33 In Insurance Agents, the Supreme Court held that the NLRB
29. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 242-43 (quoting Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485,
490-91 (1953)).
30. Id at 245.
31. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1976).
32. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
33. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
1993]
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did not have authority to find a violation of the duty to bargain in
good faith where the union engaged in tactics not protected or prohib-
ited by the NLRA. 4 While engaged in contract negotiations on behalf
of its members with the Prudential Insurance Company, the union and
its members began concerted on-the-job activities designed to harass
the company.
3 5
Prudential filed a charge with the NLRB claiming the union re-
fused to bargain collectively.36 The NLRB determined that the union's
activities amounted to a failure to bargain in good faith pursuant to its
duties under section 8 of the NLRA and issued a cease and desist
order against the union. 7
The Supreme Court characterized the NLRB's decision as an intru-
sion into national labor policy. 38 The Court stated that "Congress in-
tended that the parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations,
unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate the substantive
solution of -their differences. '39 The Court also declared that "at the
present statutory stage of our national labor relations policy, the two
factors-necessity for good-faith bargaining between parties, and the
availability of economic pressure devices to each to make the other
party incline to agree on one's terms-exist side by side."40 Addi-
tionally, the Court reasoned that *_o allow the NLRB to interject itself
into these processes would undermine national labor policy because the
NLRB would effectively enter the bargaining process to an extent
Congress has not authorized.41
In a'similar vein, the Supreme Court, in Teamsters Union v. Mor-
ton,42 held that a state was precluded from awarding damages, under
its common law, where a urion had engaged in secondary boycott
34. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 490.
35. a at 479-80.
36. Id.
37. Ia at 481.
38. a at 488-89.
39. IaL at 488.
40. IA at 489.
41. Ia at 498.
42. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
[Vol. 95:877
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activities which were not protected or prohibited by the NLRA.43 Al-
though the focus of the Court's decision in Morton was on the state's
regulation rather than on the NLRB as in Insurance Agents, its reason-
ing was the same. The Court embraced the rationale that secondary
boycott measures, such as those taken by the union in Morton, are
weapons of self-help permitted by the NLRA and that such tactics
formed an integral part of the union's "effort to achieve its bargaining
goals during negotiations with the respondent."' The Court further
stated that if allowed to stand, state regulation and control of second-
ary boycott activity would "frustrate the congressional determination to
leave this weapon of self-help available and ... upset the balance of
power between labor and management expressed in our national labor
policy. '
45
These seminal cases eventually resulted in the Court's decision in
the case of International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission." The es-
sence of the Machinists doctrine is that activities engaged in by either
an employer or an employee, which are not protected or prohibited
under sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA, are not regulable by either a state
or the NLRB; instead, such activities were intended by Congress to be
available to each party in labor negotiations or disputes and should be
left to the free play of economic forces.47
In Machinists, the union and its members engaged in a concerted
refusal to work overtime during ongoing negotiations for a collective
bargaining agreement with the employer." The employer filed a
charge with both the NLRB and the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission charging that the refusal to work overtime constituted an
unfair labor practice under federal and state law.49
43. Id at 260. Note that the secondary boycott activity in Morton is addressed under
section 303 of the NLRA as opposed to sections 7 or 8; however, the analysis by the
Court is the same.
44. Id at 259.
45. Id at 260.
46. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
47. Id at 136-55.
48. Id at 134.
49. Id at 135.
1993]
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The NLRB dismissed the charge on the ground that the concerted
refusal to work overtime did not violate the NLRA; thus, under Insur-
ance Agents, the refusal was not conduct cognizable by the NLRB.' °
The Wisconsin Commission, however, decided that the activity in
question was not arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA and
therefore, the Commission was not preempted from regulating such
conduct.51 The state Commission further concluded that the refusal to
work overtime constituted an unfair labor practice under Wisconsin law
and it entered a cease and desist order against the union.52
Subsequent to affirmation by both the Circuit Court and the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.5 3 In its majority opinion, the Court's analysis focuses on a
survey of federal preemption in the field of labor law, beginning with
an outline of the Garmon doctrine.54 The Court then states that "a
second line of pre-emption analysis has been developed in cases focus-
ing upon the crucial inquiry whether Congress intended that the con-
duct involved be unregulated because left 'to be controlled by the free
play of economic forces."' 55 In giving substance to this preemption
analysis, the Court draws mainly from its decisions in Insurance
Agents and Morton, ultimately stating that "the crucial inquiry regard-
ing preemption is ... whether 'the exercise of plenary state authority
to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effective imple-
mentation of the [NLRA's] processes.', 56 The Machinists Court an-
swers this inquiry in the affirmative, stating that the Wisconsin law
impinges upon the union's use of economic pressure which, under the
NLRA, is "part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining." 57
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 135-36.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 138-39.
55. Id. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)).
56. Id. at 147-48 (quoting Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Tenninal
Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380 (1969)).
57. Id. at 148-49 (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union, 361 U.S.
477, 495 (1960)).
[Vol. 95:877
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C. A Recent Development in Federal Preemption
More recently, the Supreme Court expanded federal preemption in
the labor relations area with its decision in Golden State Transit v.
City of Los Angeles (Golden State 1).51 Prior decisions dealt with
state regulation of activities where either labor or management was the
actor. However, in Golden State I, the focus was on governmental
activity that interfered with the rights of parties under the NLRA in a
labor dispute. 59 Golden State operated a taxicab franchise in Los An-
geles California. ° While its franchise renewal application was pend-
ing with the city, Golden State's contract with its cab drivers ex-
pired.61 After a short term contract between Golden State and the un-
ion also expired, the drivers went on strike.62 The Los Angeles City
Council determined that it would not renew Golden State's franchise
unless the strike was settled in an allotted amount of time.63 Subse-
quently, when the strike was not settled within City Council's time
frame, Golden State's franchise expired.
64
The Court held that the city's action in conditioning Golden
State's taxicab franchise renewal on the settling of a 'strike by its
employees impinged upon economic measures of self-help guaranteed
to parties in a labor dispute under the NLRA. 65 The Court flatly re-
jected the city's argument that its action was based on its transporta-
tion policy and that it had not intended to regulate labor relations. By
its actions, the Court stated, the city had entered into the bargaining
process in a manner that Congress has not authorized.66
58. 475 U.S. 608 (1986) [hereinafter Golden State 1].
59. IM
60. IM at 609.
61. Id.
62. IM at 610.
63. I at 611.
64. Id
65. Id at 618.
66. Id at 615-18.
19931]
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D. Exceptions to Federal Preemption
Although the development of NLRA preemption principles in the
area of labor law has largely circumscribed state regulation, there are
instances where state regulation has been deemed valid. The Supreme
Court has allowed state court causes of action and regulations under
the guise of "traditional police powers" and "matters which are of
peripheral concern" to labor policy. Although these exceptions are
given separate titles, there is a certain amount of overlap in the two
doctrines.
1. Traditional Police Powers
Fairly early in the development of NLRA preemption principles,
the Supreme Court recognized a state's right to exercise its traditional
police powers over public safety and order. In United Elecical, Radio
& Machine Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board67 (Allen-Bradley) the Court considered whether a Wisconsin
statute conflicted with the NLRA and thus should be preempted. 8
The statute in question made it an unfair labor practice for an employ-
ee or the union to engage in mass picketing, to inflict personal injury
or property damage, and to block ingress and egress to and from any
place of employment.' During a strike situation, the union in Allen-
Bradley engaged in such prohibited activities against its employer,
prompting the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board to issue a cease
and desist order against the union.70
On appeal, in considering whether the Wisconsin statute conflicted
with the policies and purposes of the NLRA, the Supreme Court stated
that it would not lightly infer that Congress preempted a state's sov-
ereignty to exercise its police powers "over such traditionally local
matters as public safety and order."71 An important consideration in
67. 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
68. Id
69. Id. at 741-42.
70. I& at 743.
71. I& at 749.
(Vol. 95:877
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the Court's preemption analysis was that Congress had not placed
these types of activities under regulation of the NLRA. 72 As a result,
the Court concluded that "the [NLRA] was not designed to preclude a
state from enacting legislation limited to the prohibition or regulation
of this type of employee or union activity. 73
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has continued this trend.
In United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Co.,74 the
Court held that a common-law tort action brought in state court for
damages sustained by a union's violent conduct was not preempted by
the NLRA.75 In Laburnum, the employer was forced to abandon its
work projects due to threats, intimidation, and violence on the part of
the union.76 As a result, the employer brought a common-law tort
action against the union in state court. The jury found for the employ-
er, awarding both compensatory and punitive damages.77
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether this type of
state court action was preempted by the NLRB's exclusive jurisdic-
tion.78 In its analysis, the Court reasoned that because Congress pro-
vided no alternative for traditional state court actions to collect tort
damages under the NLRA, to preempt such a right of recovery would
"deprive [respondent] of its property without recourse or compensa-
tion., 79 The Court further stated that to deny such a cause of action,
would allow unions to destroy property without fear of liability."
72. Id Although this case precedes the 1947 amendment to the NLRA, which argu-
ably does place these types of activities under the Act, the Court continues to uphold state
regulation of such activities under the traditional police power analysis.
73. Id at 748.
74. 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
75. Id; see also UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1957) (upholding a state cause of
action against a union for tortious conduct during a labor dispute); Youngdahl v. Rainfair,
Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (upholding a state court injunction ordering a union to cease and
desist unlawful picketing, violent conduct, and interference with ingress and egress to and
from an employer's facilities).
76. Id at 658.
77. Id
78. Id
79. Id at 663-64.
80. Id at 669.
19931
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2. Matters of Peripheral Concern to Labor Policy
The Supreme Court has also recognized an exception to federal
preemption where state regulations and causes of action are of periph-
eral concern to the NLRA. The rationale of this exception is not nec-
essarily that the state regulation or cause of action does not conflict
with the NLRA, but rather that the conflict is so remote that it does
not have a detrimental effect on NLRA policies.
In New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of
Labor,8 the Supreme Court upheld a New York law that conflicted
with the NLRA because Congress intended to tolerate such a con-
flict.82 The employees here engaged in a seven month strike." Un-
der New York's unemployment law, the strikers collected unemploy-
ment benefits from the ninth week of the strike until it was over.84
The employer brought suit seeking an injunction against enforcement
of this provision of New York's unemployment compensation law.85
The employer argued that such benefits to strikers interfered with the
NLRA policy of free collective bargaining between labor and manage-
ment because not only was the employer contributing in large part to
provide these benefits but also the benefits to striking employees en-
couraged them to remain on strike. 6
Although the Supreme Court did not reject the employer's interfer-
ence with free collective bargaining argument, the Court stated that the
New York law was not an attempt to regulate conduct within the
labor-management relationship, but rather a state program designed to
ensure employment security. 7 The Court further reasoned that be-
cause Congress had given consideration to and not foreclosed provid-
ing unemployment benefits to strikers when it passed the NLRA and
81. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
82. a
83. a at 522.
84. Ia at 523.
85. Id. at 525.
86. Id at 523-26.
87. Ia at 532-33.
[Vol. 95:877
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the Social Security Act, it had decided to tolerate many conflicts
which might arise out of such state legislation.88
In addition to state regulations, the Supreme Court has also upheld
state court causes of action under the rationale of peripheral concern to
the NLRA. In International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales,8 9
the Supreme Court upheld a state court action which awarded rein-
statement and damages to a wrongfully expelled union member on the
basis that conflict with the policies of the NLRA was too remote.9°
The union member had been expelled from the union in violation of
the union's constitution and he filed suit in state court seeking rein-
statement and damages.9' The state court entertained the action and
awarded the relief sought. The union appealed on the basis of preemp-
tion under the NLRA. 2
On appeal, the Supreme Court classified the relationship between
unions and their members as contractual and the present action as a
breach of that contractual relationship. 93 The Court then stated that
"the protection of union members from arbitrary conduct by un-
ions... has not been undertaken by federal law, and indeed the as-
sertion of any such power has been expressly denied."94 Further, the
NLRB could not provide the same relief that the state court gave
pursuant to its contract and damages laws.95 The Court concluded that
the possibility of conflict between the state court judgment and the
policies of the NLRA was too remote to warrant preemption.96
The Supreme Court has continued to uphold similar state court
actions. More recently, in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale,97 the Court held that
88. l at 537-46. But see Wisconsin Dep't of Industry, Labor & Human Relations v.
Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986) (strildng down a Wisconsin statute, which barred three
time NLRA violators from doing business in the state, due to its interference with NLRA
policy).
89. 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
90. I
91. Id at 618.
92. Id
93. Id at 618-21.
94. Id at 620.
95. Id at 621.
96. Id
97. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
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a state court action for misrepresentation and breach of contract was
not preempted by the NLRA." In Belknap, the employer hired re-
placement workers following a strike by its employees. 9 At the time
of hiring and subsequently, the employer made promises of permanent
employmeit to the replacements regardless of the outcome of the
strike.1  Upon settlement of the strike, the employer disregarded its
promises and reinstated the strikers. 10 The ensuing state court action
by the replacements sought damages from the employer for misrepre-
sentation and breach of contract. 2 The employer argued preemption
of the state court cause of action because it conflicted with the NLRA
under both the Garmon and the Machinists doctrines.' °3
The Supreme Court rejected the employer's argument on the basis
that the NLRA, although allowing an employer to hire permanent
replacement workers, does not preclude a remedy for actionable behav-
ior such as the employer engaged in here." The Court stated that
the replacement workers did not come within the free zone of eco-
nomic forces set out in the Machinists doctrine and thus, although the
strikers and the employer were free to use economic weapons against
each other, neither was free to inflict injury upon the replacement
workers without attendant liability. 05
The Court also rejected preemption under the Garrnon doctrine
stating that Garmon allowed states to regulate conduct of peripheral
concern to the NLRA.' 6 An important factor in the Court's analysis
98. Id.
99. Id. at 494.
100. IM at 494-96. It should be noted that during an economic strike by employees, an
employer is permitted to hire permanent replacements. However, during an unfair labor
practice strike, even though an employer may hire replacements for the duration of the
strike, striking employees are entitled to their previous jobs once the strike is settled.
101. Id. at 496.
102. Id. at 496-97.
103. Id at 499.
104. Id. at 500.
105. Id
106. Id. at 509; see also Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
Am., 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (holding that the NLRA did not preempt a state action for inten-
tionally inflicting emotional distress, even" though a major part of the cause of action con-
sisted of conduct that was arguably an unfair labor practice); Linn v. United Plant Guard
[Vol. 95:877
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was that the state court action by the replacement workers had nothing
in common with any NLRB adjudications of the strike. 7 The Court
concluded that the state court action was not preempted because it
"would not interfere with the [NLRB's] determination of matters with-
in its jurisdiction and that such an action is of no more than peripheral
concern to the [NLRB] and the [NLRA]." 08
III. RUM CREEK II
Recently, in Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton"° (Rum
Creek II), federal preemption of state action under the NLRA was
revisited. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
applied the existing principles of NLRA preemption doctrine to strike
down West Virginia's Neutrality Statute as an impediment to the poli-
cies of the NLRA." °
In its decision in Rum Creek II, the Fourth Circuit relies mainly
on the Machinists doctrine of preemption. Under Machinists, the court
determined that Rum Creek's right under the NLRA to utilize econom-
ic weapons in reserve, namely continued operation of its business
during the strike by its employees, was impeded when the State Police
allowed the strikers to carry on in a violent and unlawful manner."'
A. Statement of the Case
Rum Creek operated a coal mine and preparation plant in southern
West Virginia.112 In August 1989, the United Mine Workers of
Workers of Am., 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (holding that false and malicious statements in the
course of a labor dispute were actionable under state law if injurious to reputation, even
though such statements were in themselves unfair labor practices adjudicable by the NLRB).
107. Ia at 510.
108. a at 511. Although this specific language was stated in reference to the misrep-
resentation action in Belknap, the same rationale was applied to the breach of contract ac-
tion. Id. at 512.
109. 971 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Rum Creek I]].
110. Id
111. Id
112. Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Rum Creek 1].
19931
15
Reed: Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton: The Fourth Circuit Preemp
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
America (UMWA) and employees of Rum Creek engaged in a strike
that was marked by violence, personal injury, substantial property
damage, and blockage of ingress and egress to and from Rum Creek's
plant 3 As a result of these actions on the part of the UMWA and
its employees, Rum Creek was prevented from transporting essential
materials to and from its plant, causing substantial losses of reve-
nue.
114
Prior to the strike at Rum Creek, in anticipation of a strike at
another coal mine, the West Virginia Department of Public Safety
(State Police) issued a memorandum interpreting two West Virginia
statutes.1 5  The statutes in question were known as the
"Trespass"11 6  and "Neutrality11 7  Statutes.118  The memorandum
stated:
[Troopers are simply proscribed from taking sides or doing anything not
clearly in pursuit of legitimate law enforcement. Assaults, batteries and
destruction, of private property should be prevented and treated as any
crime .... However, labor demonstrators on private roads or land should
not be bothered until appropriate warrants or court orders are obtained by
the owners of said roads or land." 9
Initially, Rum Creek sought and received state court and NLRB
injunctions enjoining the UMWA from obstructing ingress and egress
to and from Rum Creek's plant and from other illegal activities.2
When these injunctions proved ineffective, Rum Creek brought suit in
113. IM at 356.
114. IM
115. Id
116. W. VA. CODE § 61-3B-3(d) (1992) ("Notwithstanding and in addition to any other
penalties provided by law, any person who performs or causes damage to property in the
course of a willful trespass shall be liable to the property owner in the amount of twice the
amount of such damage: Provided, That the provisions of this article shall not apply in a
labor dispute.").
117. W. VA. CopE § 15-2-13 (1991) ("No officer or member of the department of
public safety may, in any labor trouble or dispute between employer and employee, aid or
assist either patty thereto, but shall in such cases see that the statutes and laws of this
State are enforced in a legal way and manner.").
118. Rum Creek I, 926 F.2d at 356.
119. Id (emphasis in original).
120. Id.
[Vol. 95:877
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federal court against the State Police seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief.121 Rum Creek also sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin
the State Police from enforcing the Trespass and Neutrality Stat-
utes.122
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia denied the preliminary injunction.123 Rum Creek appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which, in
Rum Creek I, reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction regard-
ing the Trespass Statute but resolved no issues regarding the Neutrality
Statute.'2 Subsequently, Rum Creek filed a motion for summary
judgment with the district court, seeking to have both the Trespass and
Neutrality Statutes declared unconstitutional because the statutes con-
flicted with federal law.'2 The district court granted Rum Creek's
motion as to the Trespass Statute but denied the motion as to the
Neutrality Statute. 126
Rum Creek appealed the denial of its motion for summary judg-
ment as to the Neutrality Statute. 127 The Fourth Circuit held that the
Neutrality Statute, as interpreted and applied, violated Rum Creek's
federally protected right to withstand a strike by creating an imped-
iment to the clear federal purpose of the protection of the free expres-
sion of peaceful economic forces in a strike situation.'28
B. The Opinion
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis in Rum Creek II by stating
that the West Virginia Neutrality Statute has a substantial impact on
the federally regulated labor-management relationship.1 29 The court
noted that Congress has promulgated specific rules which give broad
121. 1& at 357.
122. I&
123. Id.
124. Id at 367.
125. Rum Creek II, 971 F.2d at 1149.
126. Id
127. Id
128. IA at 1154.
129. Id. at 1152.
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rights to labor and management, concluding that to the extent the
Neutrality Statute violates, is inconsistent with, or undermines these
rules, it must be preempted.130
The court then declared that while not all state regulation of the
labor-management relationship is preempted, the types of state regula-
tion that are preempted under the Machinists doctrine are those that
restrict "the free play of economic forces."3 Among the economic
tactics included in the "free play of economic forces" are striking and
withstanding strikes.1
32
Although the Neutrality Statute does not seek to regulate the la-
bor-management relationship directly, the court declared that the State
Police interpretation of the statute led to stationing troopers in
nonoptimal positions and failing to deter strikers from blocking ingress
and egress to and from Rum Creek's plant133
The court's application of the Machinists doctrine led it to find
that the State Police interpretation and application of the Neutrality
Statute restricted Rum Creek's right to apply economic pressure and
withstand the strike by allowing the strikers a private sanctuary from
which to impede ingress and egress to and from Rum Creek's
plant." The court further buttressed its analysis by reference to
Golden State I, where the Supreme Court similarly applied the Ma-
chinists doctrine to strike down an action by the city which impinged
upon an employer's right to withstand a strike.
135
After applying the Machinists analysis to preempt the Neutrality
Statute, the court stated that the statute likely could have withstood
preemption had the State Police given it a different interpretation and
application." 6 Offering an example that could withstand preemption,
the court stated that, "[a] more preferable application of a doctrine of
neutrality would mandate neutral enforcement of the laws of the state,
130. IL
131. IdL at 1153.
132. Id
133. Id at 1151.
134. Id at 1154.
135. Rum Creek II, 971 F.2d at 1154.
136. Id
[Vol. 95:877
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not neutral acquiescence to unlawful acts of destruction, and would
promote, or at least not effectively undermine, the federal purpose of
free interplay of economic forces."'137
In addition, the court characterized a "labor dispute" as a playing
field which Congress intends to be equal.138 Ensuring that this play-
ing field remains equal necessarily requires the "reasonable protection
of law and order by a disinterested and neutral referee." 139 The court
described the action by the State Police as providing far from that and
stated, "[tihe failure to do anything to come between the strikers and
management condoned violence and served to provide unjustified sup-
port to the strikers by restricting the pressure which the appellant
could lawfully bring to bear in support of its own anti-strike ef-
forts.'
14°
C. Analysis
The court's preemption of the Neutrality Statute, as interpreted and
applied, was warranted under existing NLRA preemption principles.
However, the court's language in Rum Creek II creates confusion re-
garding the current status of the statute for two reasons. First, the
court implies that the Neutrality Statute, on its face, would withstand
preemption. Second, the court seemingly imposes an affirmative duty
on the State Police to ensure and protect an equal playing field exists
between labor and management in a labor dispute.
Although the court does not explicitly make the statement, the
Neutrality Statute, on its face, would withstand federal preemption as
an exception under either a "traditional police powers" or a "matter of
peripheral concern" approach.' 41 West Virginia enacted the Neutrality
Statute in 1919 as part of the bill creating the Department of Public
Safety. 42 At that particular time in West Virginia's history, it was
137. Id (emphasis in original).
138. Id
139. Id
140. Id
141. See Rum Creek 1I, 971 F.2d at 1154; see also discussion supra part I1.D.
142. 1919 W. Va. Acts ch. 12 § 15 (now codified at W. VA. CODE § 15-2-13 (1991)).
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common practice for coal mine operators to utilize local law enforce-
ment officials as "strikebreakrs" and "union busters."14 3 This prac-
tice was utilized to deter employees from organizing. The resulting
clashes between law enforcement officials and labor, as well as be-
tween management and labor, were often profused with violence.1"4
Although the legislative history pertaining to the Neutrality Statute is
virtually non-existent, the court in Rum Creek II believed that it was
intended as a measure to preclude the newly created State Police from
becoming another armed agent of coal mine operators.
1 45
Thus, the Neutrality Statute, on its face, would qualify as a tradi-
tional police power exception to NRLA preemption. The statute, by its
terms, seeks to dispel violence and criminal conduct not only on the
part of law enforcement officials, but also on the part of labor and
management. Although not expressly speaking to state regulations
concerning criminal acts of law enforcement officials, the Supreme
Court has long upheld state regulation of violent and criminal conduct
on the part of unions and employers. 146
The Neutrality Statute, on its face, would also qualify as a matter
of peripheral concern to labor policy. The mandate of the Neutrality
Statute does not seek to enter into the substantive policies of the
NLRA by placing additional -obligations on either labor or manage-
ment. In actuality, the Neutrality Statute does not "regulate" the labor-
management relationship per se; it simply seeks to prevent criminal
conduct on the part of both law enforcement and labor and manage-
ment in a labor dispute.
Thus, if the dispute had arisen over its terms alone, the Neutrality
Statute would have withstood preemption. The distinction in Rum
Creek II, which gave the Fourth Circuit a basis for preemption, was
143. HOWARD B. LEE, BLOODIETTING IN APPALACHIA 89 (1969). For further discus-
sions on the history of West Virginia's labor movement and infamous "mine wars," see
DAvID ALAN CORBIN, LIFE, WORK, AND REBELLON IN THE COAL FIELDS: THE SOUTHERN
WEST VIRGINIA MINERS, 1880-1922 (1981); RICHARD D. LUNT, LAW & ORDER VS THE
MINERS (1979).
144. Id. at 89-93.
145. See Rum Creek 1 926 F.2d at 355.
146. See discussion supra part l1.D.1.
S896 [Vol. 95:877
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not the terms of the statute, but the manner in which it was interpreted
and applied by the State Police. In cases prior to Golden State I, pre-
emption analysis focused on state regulation where labor or manage-
ment were the actors.147 Under a Golden State I analysis, however,
the State Police interpretation and application of the statute was state
action analogous to City Council's conditioning Golden State's fran-
chise renewal on settlement of its labor dispute. As in Golden State I,
state action on the part of the State Police in Rum Creek II impeded
the labor-management relationship by denying Rum Creek its right to
carry on its business operations during a labor dispute.
The second point of confusion in the court's language in Rum
Creek II is that the court has seemingly imposed an affirmative duty
on the State Police to ensure and protect an equal playing field be-
tween labor and management during labor disputes. The existence of
such an affirmative duty on the State Police is suggested by the
court's statements that:
Without neutral enforcement of the law, the criminal acts of one or anoth-
er party in a labor dispute can effectively hold that federal purpose hos-
tage, as the acts of the strikers did here.
.... The equal playing field of labor dispute must effectively in-
clude the reasonable protection of law and order by a disinterested and
neutral referee. Without that neutral enforcement agent, and without the
prevention of wholesale unlawful and violent activity, the free zone of
economic forces required by federal law is an impossibility.
148
An affirmative duty is further suggested by the court in a footnote
which declares that the state's failure to prevent similar illegality if
committed against the union also would be held "as a failure to pro-
tect a free zone of economic activity mandated by federal law."1 49
When considering this apparent affirmative duty imposed upon the
State Police in conjunction with the court's implicit declaration that the
Neutrality Statute, on its face, would withstand preemption, the ulti-
mate fate of the statute becomes unclear. The court is effectively pre-
147. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
148. Rum Creek II, 971 F.2d at 1154.
149. Id. at n.9.
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empting the Neutrality Statute with one hand while giving the state an
affirmative duty to carry out its mandates with the other. If the court
is limiting preemption of the Neutrality Statute to its interpretation and
application, a more clear and forceful statement to that effect is para-
mount in order for the state of West Virginia to know the status of
the Neutrality Statute.
In the final analysis, regardless of whether the court's opinion is
read as preempting the Neutrality Statute outright, the apparent imposi-
tion of an affirmative duty upon the State Police to ensure and protect
the equal playing field of labor dispute is unwarranted. Although there
is no question that federal preemption principles articulate the concept
of a "free zone of economic forces" into which the states may not
generally inject themselves, there has been no articulation by any court
which suggests that states are under an affimative duty to ensure and
protect this zone. The practical effect of such an imposition on the
states would amount to the states being the armed agent of the NLRA.
The states have never been expressed as being within the scope or
policy of the NLRA. If the court is making such an assertion here,
then it has gone beyond valid boundaries of federal preemption princi-
ples and effectuated policy which was not intended by Congress in
enacting the NLRA.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Rum Creek II, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that West Virginia's Neutrality Statute impinged
upon the free zone of economic forces intended, under the NLRA, to
be available to parties involved in a labor dispute.150 The court relied
on the Machinists doctrine of federal preemption and the Golden State
I opinion to hold that the State Police interpretation and application of
the Neutrality Statute denied Rum Creek's right to withstand a strike
by allowing the strikers to block ingress and egress to and from Rum
Creek's plant.' 51
150. Id at 1153.
151. Id at 1154.
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The court's decision to preempt the Neutrality Statute, as interpret-
ed and applied, comports with existing NLRA preemption principles.
However, the court's opinion raises unanswered questions concerning
the current status of the Neutrality Statute. First, the court implies that
the Neutrality Statute, on its face, would withstand preemption. Sec-
ond, the court seemingly imposes an affirmative duty on the State
Police to ensure and protect an equal playing field exists between
labor and management in a labor dispute. The court's opinion seems to
suggest that although the letter of the Neutrality Statute is dead, the
spirit of the statute is alive and well.
Kelly R. Reed
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